Introduction
The goal of this paper is to examine some differences between English and Romance languages in the way definite and determinerless noun phrases can be used in generic contexts. As is well known, English and other Germanic languages can use determinerless plural count and singular mass noun phrases (henceforth bare nouns) to express a generic meaning.
(1) a.
[Dogs] come in many different sizes. To express the same meaning, Romance languages (here and elsewhere, I exemplify with Italian), standardly use noun phrases with a definite article: the plural definite with count nouns and the singular definite with mass nouns (sing. il/la/lo/l', plur. i/gli/le) (2). A singular definite article with count nouns is also possible (3), with the same restrictions as in English (see e.g. Lawler 1973 , Carlson 1977 In English, and again Germanic in general, bare nouns can also have an existential reading. In (4) hungry-looking dogs, water and Italian students roughly correspond to some dogs, some water and some Italian students. In these case, the predicates must have an 'eventive' or 'transitory' character. 1 (4) a. [Hungry-looking dogs] are rummaging in my garbage. As can be imagined, this state of affairs is problematic for Germanic learners of Romance languages and vice-versa, and an area where a good understanding of the theoretical picture could at the same time deepen our comprehension of the language faculty and provide better tools to characterize and teach these differences. The existence of discrepancies even between Romance languages (see section 5.1) makes the problem even more challenging. In this article I will investigate the origin of these meanings with the help of some novel or ill-studied data from Romance languages, evaluate some previous theories and point out directions for further analyses.
Within formal semantics, the main thread in the discussion on the meaning of bare nouns since Carlson (1977) has been the relation between the generic and the existential reading. Two leading approaches have emerged. One-based on Carlson's (1977) original idea-holds that English bare nouns are always non-quantificational constructs, i.e. proper names of kinds of things; the existential reading visible in (4) is derived from the native kind-level denotation. An influential variant of this theory has been advanced in Chierchia (1998) within a study on the syntax-semantics mapping across languages (see also Dayal 2000) . I shall collectively refer to this family of theories as the neo-Carlsonian view.
In the second approach, the Ambiguity Theory, stated most explicitly in Gerstner and Krifka (1987) , Wilkinson (1991) , and Diesing (1992a) , bare nouns are ambiguous: in some contexts they are proper names of kinds, in others, weak indefinites. The existential reading comes from this latter interpretive possibility, a case in which the free variable provided by the indefinite is bound by a default existential operator. Yet other authors, e.g. Dobrovie-Sorin and Laca (1997) accept the idea of an ambiguity but reject the notion that bare nouns in existential contexts have the meaning of indefinites.
Theories of bare nouns were originally developed looking at English and German facts, but the difference between Germanic and Romance languages had been noticed and discussed since Casalegno (1987) (see also Laca 1990, and Vergnaud and Zubizaretta 1992 for a more syntactic approach). The crucial data are the following.
In French, bare nouns cannot appear as arguments. In other Romance languages they have a limited distribution. A simple bare noun such as soldati "soldiers" in Italian may appear at the left periphery of the sentence, in focus (5a) or topic (5b) position (see Rizzi 1997 , Cinque 1990 for a characterization of these positions). As arguments, bare nouns only appear in lexically governed positions: objects of verbs or prepositions (6a,b), and some postverbal subjects of unaccusatives (6c) (see Contreras 1986 , Brugger 1993 , and Delfitto and Schroten 1992 . When modified by a relative clause, or a 'heavy enough' PP or AdjP (7), Italian bare nouns may also appear in preverbal subject position (Longobardi 1994) , though they are still marginal with individual-level predicates such as be Italian/spies (7b). However, as first pointed by Casalegno (1987), a quasi-universal or 'kind'-reading of Italian bare nouns doesn't seem to be available (more on this below). The standard tool to express generic noun phrase meanings in Romance languages is the definite determiner. Given these facts, a question immediately arises. In English, bare nouns can apparently have two meanings, one existential, one generic-whole theories have been constructed to capture this fact. In Italian, however, the same meanings are expressed using two very different constructions: bare nouns or the partitive indefinite for the existential, definite nouns for the generic meaning. How can the two competing approaches developed for English account for this obviously different syntax/semantics mapping?
The answer I will put forward is that Italian definites are closer to English bare nouns than has been previously assumed. Apart from their generic/quasi-universal meaning, definites in Italian (and to some extent in other Romance languages) have an indefinite reading which is absent in English definites, and which is nicely captured by one of the leading theories of English bare nouns. At the same time, I will defend the (old) idea than bare nouns in Romance differ from English bare nouns in not being able to denote kinds.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. After listing some available tests I will evaluate the two competing approaches to noun phrase genericity in English and consider three possible extensions to the Romance facts. Section 3.1 will give examples of the indefinite reading of definites. Section 4 will discuss in some detail Chierchia's (1998) neo-Carlsonian view of kind-denoting noun phrases. Section 4.3 will reevaluate the 'indefinite definite' data and make a proposal. The last two sections will contain some preliminary remarks on the circumstances which allow the 'indefinite definite' interpretation to arise, and some cross-linguistic differences.
Tests for noun phrase genericity
Various tests have been proposed at least since Lawler (1973) to distinguish between noun phrases which refer to or quantify over ordinary objects and noun phrases which range over kinds. All are based on the nature of the predicates involved.
Kind-level predicates. Probably the best case for the linguistic relevance of kinds comes from predicates which cannot usually apply to ordinary individuals: (9a) contrasts with (10), hash-marked assuming a biologically normal world. These predicates may also be episodic. (9) a. Domestic dogs evolved from jackals / appeared 100000 years ago / will became extinct / become bigger and bigger as you look back into the history of civilization / have increased by 4% throughout the country¡ b. Light-bulbs were created / invented / perfected / analyzed¡ by Edison.
(10) #Fido evolved from jackals / appeared 100000 years ago / will became extinct / becomes bigger and bigger as you look back to the history of civilization / has increased by 4% throughout the country¡ Taxonomic properties of kinds. "Dogs with long, uncombed fur" are "dogs", which are in turn "mammals", which are "animals", and so forth. Only kinds have the property of being divisible into more specific subkinds, defining a taxonomy along some dimension (e.g. size, biological type Carlson (1977) and others involves quantificational properties, or more exactly properties which refer to the spatial/temporal frequency (i.e. ratio between number of individuals and space/time units) of some class.
(12) Dogs are common / rare / abundant / widespread / scarce ¡ in this region.
One reason for the popularity of this test is the sharp judgment that no overt quantifier can be introduced in (12) (barring a quantification-over-subkind reading, where twenty dogs means "twenty types of dog"). I will return to the reliability of this test in section 4.1.
(13) a. * All / most / those / the¡ dogs are common / rare / abundant / widespread / scarce ¡ . b. * Twenty / many / some/ one¡ dog(s) is/are common / rare / abundant / widespread / scarce¡ .
Characterizing sentences. Quantitatively speaking, the vast majority of 'generic' uses of noun phrases are found in characterizing sentences (see Krifka et al. 1995 for a discussion of this terminology), sentences which express a regularity of a non-accidental nature. 3 (14) a. Dogs bark at the moon / have four legs / hate cats¡ b. Young roosters like hens / compete for supremacy¡
Opinions differ on the proper analysis of characterizing sentences. In Carlson's original approach, the noun phrases in such sentences were still interpreted as kinds. However, many predicates found in characterizing sentences with bare nouns may also form characterizing sentences with indefinites like "a dog/two dogs".
a. A dog (usually) barks at the moon. b. A normal dog (always) has four legs. c. Two young roosters (always) compete for supremacy.
These cases can be easily treated using the quantificational schema in (16) and (17), where an overt or covert adverb of quantification binds the free variable provided by the indefinite (see Lewis 1975 , Heim 1982 In characterizing sentences, on the other hand, bare nouns are interpreted as indefinites bound by a quasi-universal operator Gn. The quantification is also restricted to appropriate 'situations' s or 'times' (e.g. normal situations when barking at the moon would be appropriate), which are also unselectively bound by the Gn operator:
b. "For each appropriate situation s, if x is a dog in s than x barks at the moon in s"
In the existential meaning, the free variable provided by the indefinite bare noun is bound by a 'default' existential quantifier (Existential Closure, EC). In Diesing (1992a) and Kratzer (1995) , the domain of application of Gn and EC also corresponds to different parts of the sentential structure (restrictive and nuclear clause).
In the neo-Carlsonian approach kinds do more work: bare plurals in English denote kinds, but may be turned into indefinites providing a free variable by a type-shifting operator which applies whenever the predicate requires an object-level argument. In existential contexts, this type-shifting operation ("Derived Kind Predication" in Chierchia 1996) also inserts an existential quantifier. (20b) is interpreted as (20c): 4 4 More precisely, in this system count nouns can be directly generated as property-denoting entities, but they need to be turned into kinds by the "down" ¥ type-shifter 'after' having been pluralized to order get the e-type denotation which is required in argument position. This denotation, i.e. ¥ lions, is the input for the DKP shift described (see Chierchia, (20) a. Derived Kind Predication (Chierchia 1996,364) If P applies to objects and k denotes a kind, then In characterizing sentences we again have a type-mismatch between a predicate which doesn't accept kinds (e.g. "bark") and a bare noun which denotes one. This mismatch drives the application of § , and ultimately the creation of an indefinite with a free variable, which is bound by the Gn operator as seen above : 5 (21) a. Dogs bark.
Romance definites
The first important fact about Romance definites is that they are used in all the cases seen above in (9)- (14): with kind-predicates (22a,b), taxonomic predicates (22c), quantitative properties (22d) and in characterizing sentences (22e The meaning of this 'normal' use of the definite article is captured by the maximalization operator Max (see Sharvy 1980 , Link 1983 , Chierchia 1996 . Max returns the single largest possible element in a set. Assuming that plurals denote the set of all plural individuals that can be formed with the denotation of the corresponding singular count (a set of singular individuals), Max will pick out the largest plural individual in this denotation, or will be undefined when no such element is present. In the singular, Max will be defined only when it receives a singleton set as input; this captures the fact that a phrase such as the dog i.e Max(dog) is defined only in a context in which dog 1996:356).
5 What remains unclear in this system is exactly how the kind is turned into an indefinite-with-free-variable. Clearly, bringing the kind into the domain of properties via won't do, since this would clash with the same requirement for arguments to be of type e which drives the application of the properties-to-kinds operator ¥ earlier in the derivation. A second operation must close off the property by inserting a free variable, but this operation must not be available to turn a bare singular count like "dog" into a well-formed indefinite, or we would have bare singular count nouns all over.
is a set containing a single individual dog. In this case, Max yields that individual, and is equivalent to the operator. To extend this semantics to the Romance kind-cases, various approaches seem in principle possible.
In the spirit of the ambiguity hypothesis, we could assume that Romance definites denote genuine kinds in cases such as (22a)-(22d) and indefinites in characterizing contexts such as (22e). The indefinite meaning makes available a free variable which gets bound by the generic operator, exactly as with English bare nouns. In all other, non-generic contexts, the Romance definite article denotes Max, precisely like in English. This approach gives an accurate translation of the ambiguity theory of genericity, at the expense of positing a 3-way interpretation for the Romance definite article.
At the other extreme, we have the possibility that Romance definites never really denote kinds in the sense in which English bare nouns may denote kinds: even in the kind-triggering context (22a)-(22d), Romance definite articles are interpreted as Max. For instance, in (22a) i cani would not denote a kind, but something similar to what the English phrase the dogs that may exist refers to. This proposal eliminates the ambiguity of the, but additional assumptions are needed to explain why English cannot use the definite to get the same generic meanings.
A intermediate possibility-let's call it the 2-way distinction approach-is that Italian definite noun phrases have two distinct interpretive possibilities, an object-level one which we see in (24) and a kind-level one, in (22a)-(22d). Definites in characterizing sentences must be derived from one of these two possibilities.
In what follows, I will review features and problems of the first two approaches, and conclude that the third possibility is in fact the best option.
Indefinite definites
The 3-way approach holds that definites in characterizing sentences can provide a free variable in search of a binder. In English this element can be bound by Existential Closure, so-all other things being equal-we should expect this to happen in Italian as well. However, Italian definites with predicates like those in (25) and (26) cannot take an indefinite, purely existential reading, where the uniqueness and familiarity conditions are canceled. (25) is unsurprising, since English bare nouns cannot take an existential reading with these individuallevel predicates. But the predicates in (26) do allow, and in fact force, an existential reading for bare nouns (e.g. "buildings will fall in Berlin tomorrow" is about some buildings), yet no pure existential reading arises with Romance definites. The lack of this reading is a potential problem for the 3-way approach.
But is this reading unavailable in general? Looking more carefully, we do find many other cases which force us to conclude that, in Italian, some definites can after all have a purely indefinite meaning. Consider: (27) Ogni Various things must said about these examples. First, they are all ambiguous. Gli hacker in (27) can mean either "a specific group of hackers" (the 'normal' definite meaning) or "some random members of the hacker community" (most likely not always the same in different weeks). The normal definite meaning requires a context in which this unique group can be picked out, the other meaning doesn't. Where a context is harder to construct, the normal definite meaning vanishes. For instance, i topi "the mice" and gli scarafaggi "the cockroaches" in (28) don't naturally refer to specific groups of these animals, but just to some number of mice and cockroaches. In (30), I am not necessarily referring to my usual morning coffee or tea: the sentence can very well be said by a sporadic drinker with no coffee or tea in contextual sight. The only reading of (31) and (32) out of context is one where, again, some random, ill-defined or unidentifiable ghosts/thieves are talked about. The second point is that, if we accept the idea that characterizing sentences are quantificational, and that predicates like bark at the moon are necessarily true of ordinary objects and not of kinds, then by the same token we must accept that predicates like be photographed, empty an apartment, attack my web-site and so on require ordinary objects. This entails that the Italian definites in the examples above must refer to the ordinary objects, not to the kind, the species, which would not match the predicate's requirements.
Third, the distribution of these 'indefinite definites' is quite diverse. We have objects (29), (30), (31), post-verbal subjects (28), subjects of passives (27), preverbal subjects (32). We find them in stative sentences (28), sentences with overt quantification over times (27), characterizing sentences like Fotografo gli uccelli in (29) and bere il caffè in (30), pure episodic sentences (32).
Fourth, English must use bare nouns, not definites, to get the indefinite readings just described: This is an important point, because it rules out the possibility that the 'indefinite' reading of (27)- (32) is actually a definite description plus the mechanism of bridging. 'Bridging' allows a definite description to pick out an object which has only indirectly been introduced into the discourse by mention of some entity associated with it. For instance, in (34b,c) the door/the windows are understood as parts of the house mentioned in (34a). Since house do not prototypically contain mice (34d) Here there is no variation between English and Italian. Thus, we would have to conclude that Italian is able to bridge more than English, but only in the specific case of definite determiners. In addition, in most cases seen so far it was not at all clear which object could be the source for the bridging. To say that (27) means "Every week my web site is attacked by the hackers which attack my web site" is simply absurd: if it were possible in Italian to import the content of the predication in the restriction of a definite we would predict that in this language definite descriptions should always be felicitous. In a normal context where floors have more than one tile but no particular tile is salient (36a) should be appropriate, with the interpretation of (36b). Finally, an account based on bridging would leave as a mystery why indefinite readings are only possible in some sentences and in some syntactic positions (see (26) and section 5).
A last argument for the indefinite reading of definites comes from the Definiteness Restriction in existential contexts. A known puzzle is the fact that Italian seems to be immune from this effect: (37) a. C'è Gianni / il mio cane¡ in giardino.
b. *There is John / my dog¡ is the garden. Zucchi (1995) and Zamparelli (1995) argue that the apparent lack of DR is due to a possible locative interpretation for Italian Ci-sentences: (37a) does not assert existence, but simply that Gianni is in the garden. Temporal cases where the nominal is a specific, non-eventive definite are indeed worse (38a I will return to the indefinite reading of definites in section 4.3. Here, it is sufficient to note that the 3-way ambiguity hypothesis gains some credibility from the existence of such cases: all the readings we expect in principle, including the purely existential one, are actually found. On the other hand, the cases in (26) are not amenable to an indefinite interpretation, so the 3-way proposal still owes an account of when a definite may be interpreted as an indefinite.
The Neo-Carlsonian View
Chierchia's (1998) main argument against the ambiguity theory of English bare nouns goes as follows.
In the ambiguity hypothesis, the kind meaning of a bare noun is completely independent from its existential meaning. Therefore, it should be possible to block one without blocking the other. In particular, kinds have an intrinsic intensional component which is optional in a plain indefinite: the kind dog¤ (an entity) bears an intuitive relation with the intension of the property dog, the set of dogs in all possible worlds. This intensional dimension can be blocked by inserting a rigid designator (a proper name or a deictic element) in the restriction of the bare noun. This, people, ship parts and rabbits can be kinds, but people next to me, parts of the "Titanic" or rabbits that just bit you cannot (39) (see Carlson 1977:316) . As is well known, existentially interpreted bare nouns are unusual indefinites in that, in Italian as in English, they always take narrow scope with respect to intensional operators (40a), negation (40b), temporal adverbial (40c) and pronoun reference (40d). ( This would be expected if the existential reading with narrowest scope was derived from the kind meaning via the DKP operation: once the kind reading is blocked by the presence of this and Titanic, a necessary step in the derivation of this reading is missing. If the ambiguity hypothesis was correct-Chierchia argues-the connection between the impossibility of the kind meaning and the scope differences between (41) and (40) would be utterly mysterious.
Note, in passing, that Chierchia's reasoning does not lead to the conclusion that bare nouns cannot be indefinites. Quite the opposite: the non-kind-denoting bare nouns in (41) do get a well-formed reading, and a clearly existential one. As Carlson notes, these bare nouns have a limited distribution, which resembles that of overt indefinites: they cannot go with individual-level predicates, and they cannot be easily coordinated with bare nouns that may refer to kinds (cf. (42), (43) Chierchia strengthens his theory by proposing that all existential meanings having obligatory narrow scope are derived from kinds. In Italian, bare nouns are typically interpreted existentially, and have the same scopal properties as English ones (see (40)). It follows that even in Italian bare nouns must be capable of denoting kinds. Yet, as we have seen, Romance languages do not standardly use bare nouns for this purpose, but definites. Chierchia (1998) and Dayal (2000) address this issue, giving similar answers. Their idea is that Romance generic uses of the plural definite articles are simply modalized versions of the 'normal' definite meaning, Max ( , in Chierchia's formulation). Characterizing sentences are interpreted as in (44b), with a gnomic operator Gn ranging over specific dog instances in each possible world. Kind-level predicates like be extinct directly apply to this intensional meaning (45). (44) a. I cani abbaiano Chierchia (1998:392 where SHIFT is a type-shifting operation which produces, when necessary, a suitable denotation for an argument position. The idea is that in Italian noun phrases are full DPs with an empty D head, whereas in English they can be simple kind-denoting bare NPs (see footnote 4). Thus, even though English has two potential structures to generate kinds the simpler NP structure bleeds the more complex DP structure available in Italian. 6 Turning to why Italian uses generic definites instead of generic bare nouns, Chierchia's proposal is that Italian bare nouns, unlike English ones, always contain an empty D head, with special licensing requirements. The net effect of these requirements is to restrict the distribution of unmodified Italian bare nouns to those positions which are lexically licensed at LF. I'll return to this issue momentarily.
Scope and bare nouns in Italian
This sketchy summary hardly does justice to the cross-linguistic investigation attempted by Chierchia and Dayal, but it is hopefully sufficient to bring up the main points for discussion. I will start with the problem of bare noun meanings, then examine the issue of definite kinds in light of the existential readings discussed in section 4.
As we have seen, Chierchia's thesis that narrow-scope existentials are always derived from kinds requires bare nouns to be acceptable as kind denoting entities also in Italian, contra Casalegno (1987) and Longobardi (1994) . There is some disagreement over the data on this point, but it is a fact that there are Italian speakers (the author included) who accept all the narrow-scope facts given in (40), but reject the kind interpretation of bare nouns with kind-level and taxonomic predicates. For these speakers, the only (marginal) reading of the bracketed noun phrases in (47) is an existential one over either ordinary objects (e.g. God created some zebra specimens) or subkinds (types of birds evolved from types of reptiles). Picking a well-modified bare plural which is also a good natural kind doesn't help ((48a) vs. (48b,c); recall that Italian bare nouns must be modified in order to appear in subject position). However, the use of quantitative properties as a test for kindhood has come under attack (see in particular Krifka et al. 1995, sec. 1.4.1 and Longobardi 1999) . Recall that this test was linked to the impossibility of combining these predicates with overt determiners: (13) a. * All / most / those / the¡ dogs are common / rare / abundant / widespread / scarce ¡ . b. * Twenty / many / some/ one¡ dog(s) is/are common / rare / abundant / widespread / scarce¡ .
But these properties express ratios between a number and a unit. To say that an object is "common" means that, searching within a certain spatio-temporal area, one would find an above-average number of them. Quantified noun phrases like those in ((13)a) do not provide a number at all, and those in ( (13)b) express the number of objects but not the spatio-temporal search area. Longobardi (1999) shows that providing an explicit or implicit search area all the indefinite determiners become more or less acceptable. Yet, is seem highly unlikely that 3 twin dogs with birth defects may be a kind. This argument does not of course exclude the possibility that true kind-denoting elements may be acceptable with these predicates, but a test for kindhood which only rests on this class of predicates remains inconclusive. Moreover, suppose for the sake of the argument that quantitative properties did require kinds: in this case, the contrast between (a) and (b) in (51) and (52) If quantitative properties could accept other semantic types different from kinds (properties, frequencies or whatever other abstract entity is made available by our ontology), we could at least have some leverage to account for the difference above.
In the rest of this paper I will adopt the view that Romance bare nouns never denote kinds (excluding again the 'taxonomic subkind' denotation). It follows that the narrow-scope properties of (Romance) existentials cannot be derived from the kind meaning. The correlation between the impossibility of the kind reading and the availability of wide scope must be due to some other property. Let's test the idea that the relevant property is, informally, 'lack of referentiality'. It is easy to find examples of structurally different noun phrases which are intuitively non referential, and show a scope pattern remarkably similar to that of bare nouns. Consider: (53) It is very unlikely that the expression three apples at a time may be derived from a kind-no genuine kind-level predicate can accompany it. Yet, this expression displays the same narrow-scope tendencies we found with bare nouns in (40); it plainly makes no sense to ask which three apples at a time John is trying to pick, or is not picking.
Suppose that the possibility of a referential interpretation is linked to the presence of some lexical element in D at LF. In (54a), the indefinite determiner could serve this function (perhaps by moving to D from a more internal position, cf. Zamparelli 1995) . In (54b), however, there is no functional element whatsoever to be moved to D, hence no 'wide scope' is available. Rigid modifiers restore this possibility. The same happens in fact with overt indefinites: (54a) has a narrow scope option, but (55a), with a rigid modifier, has necessarily wide-scope, not unlike (55b) (54) a. John is looking for a piece of paper. b. John is looking for pieces of paper.
(55) a. John is looking for a piece of paper that Mary gave him yesterday. b. John is looking for pieces of paper that Mary gave him yesterday.
Descriptively, an object shared between two sentences (the main clause and the relative) gets the wider of the scopes it gets in each of the sentences: since a piece of paper is above all operators in the relative it must be above all operators in the main clause. In a movement analysis of scope-taking elements, this can perhaps be cast as a syntactic requirement: the rigid element inside the relative must take wide scope with respect to the main clause, but the only way to do that is to pied-pipe the relative clause and its nominal head out of all other sentential operators. Alternative accounts are possible but I will not discuss them here. 7
7 Here I am assuming that PP modifiers like in the next room pattern with full relatives. The fact that the bare noun or indefinite takes the widest scope explains the observation in Carlson (1977) that bare nouns with rigid modifiers cannot be bound by adverbials of quantification. Moving along with their clause these bare nouns end up outside the domain of the adverbial operator in the main clause.
a. *[People in the next room]
are often tall / are nice when they are born in the spring (Carlson 1977:317) 
[John] [a piece of paper that Mary gave him yesterday]! [t is looking for t! ]
To sum up, we do not need to assume the narrow-scope indefinite reading of bare nouns is always derived from kind readings via the DKP or similar operations. In Romance, where there is no strong evidence that bare nouns may denote kinds, narrow scope existential bare plurals can be generated by the same mechanism which generates other indefinites, their scope properties limited by the lack of overt material in D.
This state of affairs has some advantages over other analyses. One open question in the neoCarlsonian approach is why the mechanism which assigns existential reading to non-kind-denoting bare nouns such as parts of the "Titanic" cannot apply to ship parts as well. If it could, ship parts should be able to receive wide scope. A possible answer, in the spirit of Chierchia's approach, is that the DKP blocks the other mechanism; yet, this is made less likely by the fact that the DKP itself is assumed to be a last-resort strategy triggered by a type mismatch. Moreover, it has been argued, e.g. by Fox (1995) , that economy considerations should take semantics into account: derivations leading to different interpretations cannot be matched by economy. In our case, when we try to construct a derivation for the wide-scope reading of ship parts we find that only the normal scope system for indefinites can give us this meaning. Why should we then evaluate its economy against the DKP? The DKP just doesn't give us that output.
In the alternative I have sketched above these issues simply do not arise: the standard mechanism to give wide scope to an indefinite requires the presence of some element in D. Lacking that, the narrow-scope reading is forced. 8 The question that remains is: do we still need the DKP in English? The indefinite interpretation of bare nouns should also be available in English. If the DKP exists in this language, English would have two ways to get an existential reading out of bare plurals, which seems uneconomical. In the next section, I will argue that there are in fact reasons to keep the DKP in the system.
Italian definites revisited
The neo-Carlsonian theories considered so far (Carlson 1997 does not discuss these cases) approach Romance definites as intensional versions of normal definite noun phrases. One problem with this view is that of course 'being intensional' is a much broader notion than 'being a kind'. As Chierchia (1998:350) puts it, "not all individual concepts are going to be kinds. Only those that identify classes of objects with a sufficiently regular function and/or behavior will qualify". For instance, inserting a numeral between the determiner and its restriction blocks the kind-reading. Romolo. Romulus (cf. "In Ancient Rome, (*100) senators appeared with Romulus") Dayal's (2000) explanation for this effect seems very plausible: even if senators happened to be 100 in Romulus' times, this is not a necessity: limiting the number to be 100 in all possible worlds is an arbitrary choice, which makes it impossible for this noun phrase to be associated with the senator-kind (senator¤ ). 9 At the same time, in English as in Italian, the presence of a numeral does not block an intensional reading. Thus (58a) has a de dicto reading (meaning: the identity of the people who serve as senators changes) which makes the entailment from (a) and (b) to (c) invalid. (59) has a reading where the 4 firemen on night duty collectively picks whoever was on duty in each call-situation last year. Since the examples above are identical in Italian and English, it is not clear in which sense the English the could be any less intensional than Italian i/gli/le, or how the choice of determiners influences the intensionality of the noun phrase. Using every rather than the, intensional readings are still possible (60a), but kind-level predicates are disallowed (60b): Evidently, not all intensional noun phrases can be fed to kind-level predicates, only those that qualify as kinds-those that reflect a sufficiently regular categorization. But now, by Occam's razor, it seems pointless to posit an ontological difference between genuine kinds (the entities denoted by English bare nouns) and individual concepts which have the same restrictions as kinds, can always be turned into kinds by an operator available in the language (i.e.¨), but are not kinds. Unifying them under the banner of intensions is subject to the criticism raised in Carlson (1977) , sec. 4.0. I will go the other route and assume that English and Italian generic definites denote entities called kinds. This move poses no problems with respect to any version of the blocking principle, given our previous conclusion that Romance bare plurals do not denote kinds: there is only one way to build kinds in Romance, and it is via the definite article. 10 On the other hand, in English, where genuine kind-denoting bare nouns are possible, the definite strategy could be blocked if some version of Avoid Structure can be brought to bear on these cases. I will not try to formulate this principle here, and I will leave open for the time being the question of how exactly Romance definites acquire their kind-denotation (see Zamparelli (prep) for elaborations).
One remaining question for an account of these differences based on blocking is why there is no conflict in English between the bare plural kind-formation and the singular definite generic, or indeed between plural and singular definite kinds in Romance. The answer found in various forms in the literature is that singular and plural kind-denoting noun phrases are not equivalent (see Kleiber 1990 , Krifka et al. 1995 , Chierchia 1998 and Dayal 2000 ). Chierchia's proposal is that the singular definite generic in (61) in English and Italian is the result of turning the property tiger into a mass and then creating a group out of it.
(61)
The tiger is widespread = THE(MASS(tiger)) = g( MASS(tiger)) The choice of groups (ontologically different from pluralities) is based on the observation, attributed to Kleiber (1990) , that the singular definite generic has a 'mass noun behavior', judging from contrasts such as:
(62) a. *The tiger is three / many / numerous / helpful toward each other¡ b. Tigers are three / many / numerous / helpful toward each other¡ One could wonder, however, if this effect isn't due to other factors. The unacceptability of predicates like three, many or helpful toward each other simply follows from the fact that the tiger is syntactically singular (witness *the group is three/many/helpful toward each other). This does not extend to numerous, given the perfect acceptability of (63), but note that numerous is also deviant when applied to the kind-construction (64).
(63) The group was numerous.
(64) ??This kind of animals is numerous (in this region)
Assuming that this kind of animal does denote a genuine kind of animal, it is not clear that the unacceptability of numerous is due to a mass/count contrast. Zamparelli (1998,prep) and Dayal (2000) propose a different analysis of the definite singular generic. The idea is that nouns can denote either sets of individuals or sets of kinds. The latter is required for the subkind/taxonomic reading of (65), where the numeral ranges over types of marsupials. (65) Two marsupials lay eggs and milk their youngs.
Given that this type of denotation is independently necessary, one can simply assume that the definite article which appears in the definite generics is the normal definite article applied to the kind meaning, returning the largest possible subkind, i.e. the kind itself. 11 Once this entity (uppercase "KIND", in Dayal's notation) is distinguished from the denotation of a bare plural in English and of a definite generic plural in Italian (lowercase "kind"), no blocking effect is expected.
Indefinite definite revisited
With this discussion in mind, let's go back to the indefinite definites considered in section 3.1 and specifically to the problem of how the indefinite reading is derived. The crucial hint is that if we change the examples slightly, the indefinite reading becomes impossible: 12 In Italian, pre-nominal modifiers are generally non-restrictive. This can mean two things. The modifier of a nominal can be non-restrictive when it denotes a property possessed by all the elements denoted by the nominal in any context; or when all the elements that the nominal alone would pick out in a given context are such that the modifier would apply to them. To illustrate, enormi in (a) is non-restrictive in the first sense, since all blue whales are huge. In (b), on the other hand gli individui "the individuals" picks out a unique group of people in context, of which it is said that they are all mysterious. Generic noun phrases may contain pre-nominal adjectives which are non-restrictive in the first sense (see e.g. (a)), but not in the second. (27)- (32) is that the modifiers I have added block the possibility of reading these phrases as kinds, as shown by a sample in (72). The conclusion is (73). (72) a Following exactly the argument that Chierchia uses against the ambiguity theory of bare nouns, we now have a strong case against the 3-way proposal for Italian. In the 3-way proposal there is no connection between the kind-reading of Italian definites and their existential reading. The latter comes from the ability of Romance definites to provide a free variable for Existential Closure or equivalent mechanism. Blocking the kind reading should not affect the existential one. But as we have seen this is not what happens. The conclusion is that the existential reading is derived from the kind reading, and that the neo-Carlsonian view which links the two is after all correct. In the case of bare nouns the argument rested solely on the scopal properties of the existential reading (which had alternative explanations), but Italian definites provide in fact a better test for the DKP strategy, since here no alternative is available to assign an existential reading where familiarity and uniqueness are suspended. However, the familiar narrow-scope facts still apply: in (74) the most natural reading is one where one does not see the same mice/wolves, and (75) Once again it is sufficient to insert a non-restrictive prenominal adjective (I grossi topi "the big mice") or a numeral (I quattro UFO "the 4 UFOs") to fall back onto the normal definite interpretation.
Existential readings with singular definites
One alternative possibility to consider is that the existential reading of these cases might not be derived by the DKP, which is a simple existential over instantiations, but by a different operator, possibly the same which gives the existential reading to generic singular definites in:
(76) a. [L' auto "Megane"]è finalmente arrivata dal concessionario X the "Megane" car has finally arrived to dealer X b. Nei magazzini IKEA ho provato [il letto "Plipo"] In the IKEA warehouse I have tested the "Plipo" bed c. In queste foreste ci vivono [l' alce] The impression is that singular definite generics aren't just used to report the action of a representative: what happens to that representative must in some sense affect the kind itself. Living under my sink or eating up my viola are not memorable events in this respect, reaching Australia is, hence the difference between (76) and (77). Plural definite generics do not have this restrictions. The additional puzzle is that, as well known, singular definite generics can only be made with very specific properties (e.g. the "Plipo" bed but not the bed), while plural definite generics have no such limitations. This makes it difficult to tell whether the clear lack of a generic reading for the singular definite in e.g. (78) is due to the fact that il fantasma "ghost" and l' hacker are not sufficiently well-specified kinds, or to some other reason. It is not clear to me whether these facts mean that we cannot use the same mechanism to extract instances from singular and plural definites, or that the two do share a common operator but singular definites have additional (pragmatic?) constraints of their own. For concreteness, I will assume here that the existential reading of plural definite generic is due to the DKP and that singular definite generic resort to some other, more specific operator. Note that either choice is in agreement with the kind-denoting analysis of Romance definites given above, since both operators would take non-ordinary-individuals as input (kinds or KINDs).
Ways to indefinites
The situation discussed so far can be summarized as follows. Italian (and Romance) bare plurals cannot denote kinds, while English ones can. Italian plural noun phrases introduced by the definite article are two-way ambiguous. They have an object-level reading (which might be intensional, i.e. pick a different set of object in each world/situation) and they have a kind-level reading. As kinddenoting entities, Italian plural definites can use the DKP to acquire an existential reading. The question is in what conditions this is possible.
We have seen ( (25) above) that definite subjects of individual-level predicates do not have this reading. Moreover, contexts which provide an anchoring for the normal reading of the definite determiner (Max) seem to block the indefinite reading, as shown by e.g. (26c) repeated below, where we understand gli edifici as 'all the buildings in Berlin'. This suggests that the indefinite interpretation is in some sense a last-resort strategy. 
indef. impossible house
Similarly in (80a) the only reading is universal: generically-all hurricanes arise in the area. Inserting an overt quantification over times (80b) gives a strange meaning where it seems that hurricanes, all of them, appear over and over in the same area. On the other hand (81), where the predicate is not 'coming-into-being', may be reporting the habitual effects of some random hurricanes/locusts. The lack of an existential reading for (80) is interesting if compared with the English (82a), which can have a universal (82b) and an existential reading (82c) (see Carlson 1987) . Why isn't the second available to the Italian definites above? The answer comes from two considerations: first, the Italian bare-noun equivalent of (82a) (in (83), with a modified nominal) does have an obligatory existential reading. Second, the existentially interpreted bare nouns in (82) and (83) have a special intonational contour, which is different from that in (81). The conclusions I would like to suggest is that when the bare nouns in (82) (83) are interpreted existentially, they are not derived from a kind via the DKP, but they are born object-level indefinites (possibly moved to some high focus position, which is responsible for their special intonation). English would thus be a language with a double route to the existential meaning: in some positions the DKP is not applicable, but the indefinite route may still be available. But why should the DKP be impossible? Interesting suggestions come from Laca's (1990) discussion of how the generic reading of object bare nouns is linked to the informational structure of the sentence. According to Laca, object bare nouns can receive an existential reading if they are part of the utterance's theme, but they get a quasi-universal reading if they are part of the rheme. 13 Thus in (84) the (b) sentence is about architects (i.e. architects is the theme); the rheme, the property predicated of them, is the fact that they build houses. Since the bare noun houses is in the rheme it gets an existential meaning, while architects takes a quasi-universal reading. (84b) would not be contradicted (not even in the way generic sentences can be contradicted) by the discoveries that the majority of houses are built by engineers, but it would sound false if most architects spent all their time designing parking lots. (84) A What do architects do for a living? B: Well, architects build houses.
In Italian, both noun phrases could have a definite article, but the interpretational difference seen with bare plurals is preserved: (85) does not necessarily imply that all houses are built by architects, that all young people are killed by drugs, or that missionaries help all poor people. 14 The conclusion is that the DKP can be applied to a definite nominal when the nominal can be made to fall in the theme-which in turn depends on the choice of predicates, the context and the intonational contour. A sample translation for (85c) would be (86). 
